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Is Truth to Post-Truth what
Modernism Is to Postmodernism?
Heidegger, the Humanities, and the
Demise of Common-Sense
Klaus Benesch
1 Truth or post-truth? For most readers, the question raised in the title of this collection
conveys  a  sense  of  uneasiness  about  the  current  state  of  affairs—political,  social,
cultural—in that it juxtaposes two mutually exclusive world views: one based on facts
and on largely reliable representations of these facts, and another that posits a post-
factual world full of fake news and disinformation in which rivaling versions of reality
are in ongoing competition. It also asks us to choose between these two worlds, as if we
still had a choice, and both the world of truth and the world of post-truth were equally
available to us, either to be nurtured or rejected. What if, however, the collocation of
these two possible worlds is but a false proposition, not unlike asking: modernism or
postmodernism? Since the “post” in postmodernism evokes an irredeemable lapse of
time, a transformation that has already taken place, it can hardly be reversed. In other
words, there is no going back to modernism (or truth, for that matter) if you believe
that such a thing as postmodernism (or post-truth) really exists. You may prefer the
former, but history will not let you choose between the two, modernism will always
remain—even if preferred over its later, distorted twin—an option that is no longer an
option.
2 To consider post-truth an adequate description of our own time suggests an equally
irreversible transformation of society, the change from a previous, bygone era of truth
to a contemporary social and cultural environment predicated on alternative notions of
truth, such as “fake news,” “alternative facts,” or my personal favorite “truthiness,” a
fake word invented by the comedian Stephen Colbert who parodied cable news talk
shows on his own, now discontinued cable show The Colbert Report. Let’s assume, for the
sake  of  argument,  that  at  an  earlier  stage  of  modern  society,  truth  once  reigned
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supreme.  We would then have to  explain how the new paradigm of  post-truth has
finally come to prevail and, perhaps more importantly, why we think that truth is a
socially  desirable  good  that  should  be  embraced  and—if  now  lost—somehow
recuperated. In so doing, we should also ask to what extent the notion of post-truth is
substantially different or at least substantially distinct from previous experiences of
truth,  both  individual  and  collective.  Moreover,  there  is  the  issue  of  a  possible
causality,  as  in:  does  post-truth  follow  from  truth  as  postmodernism  follows  from
modernism? If the answer is “yes,” then any attempt to retrieve some of the values
associated with the era of  truth,  such as  veracity,  accountability,  authenticity,  etc.,
would be all but futile. If, on the other hand, the causal relations between these two
historical  moments  turn  out  to  be  rather  weak,  social  remedies  for  the  current
transformation of society and its negative consequences seem much less far-fetched.
Finally, whether we worry about the watering down of the notion of truth or whether
we embrace post-truth as our new reality, we should be altogether wary of mingling
abstract philosophical ideas with matters of politics and cultural change. To ask about
truth or post-truth is not the same as asking: what do and what can we know about the
world as it appears to us?—issues philosophers have been struggling with for centuries.
What is frequently lacking in current debates on the specters of a post-truth society are
efforts to re-envision the social contract underlying all modern democratic societies.
For  any successful  participatory  involvement  in  political  action  not  only  requires
fundamental democratic rights such as the freedom of speech; it also turns on a shared
understanding of the ultimate goals of politics and, equally important, on a meaningful
public conversation about the ways and means by which to achieve these goals.
3 In what follows, I argue that there is no such thing as post-truth. We are by no means in
the middle of an unprecedented epistemological crisis that keeps us from telling right
from wrong. Rather, what we are currently witnessing is a major breakdown of the
institutions  and  mechanisms  of  democratic  society,  triggered  by  an  encompassing
technological transformation that affects both our public and our private lives. True, in
its wake, truth claims have become increasingly contested and way more difficult to
uphold.  Even if  the challenges for rational  public  discourse are real,  however,  they
should not be countered by philosophy but by concerted, serious interventions into
political processes. My approach to the issue of post-truth, therefore, is threefold: first,
I look at how most of us in “the West” have come to agree on certain truths about
truth. As Martin Heidegger observed, our understanding of truth has often been too
narrowly focused on the correspondence between a statement and an object that is
deemed immutable and fixed. In a crucial passage of Being and Time Heidegger instead
posits an inextricable linkage between truth and un-truth, neither of which could be
completely separated from the other nor used interchangeably. And since the notion of
post-truth is often invoked to expose someone who fails to speak the truth (rather than
to demote the concept of truth as such), I also consider the Greek tradition of parrhesia,
as discussed by the late Michel Foucault. Here, I am particularly interested in the role
of “truth-speaking” as a form of critique, a rhetorical tool to positively intervene in
social and political discourses.
4 Second, I briefly comment on a recent cultural phenomenon, the alarming rise of anti-
professionalism, which for many is closely connected to the unlimited availability of
professional  knowledge  online.  As  I  argue,  anti-professional,  anti-elitist  sentiments
coupled with an increasing distrust in academic expertise have paved the way for an
allegedly  post-factual  world  and,  ultimately,  have  nibbled away at  the  authority  of
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professionals  and experts  altogether.  Long before Donald Trump waged war on the
university, the erosion of expertise, according to a remarkably prescient 2004 essay by
Bruno  Latour,  has  been  fostered—at  least  in  part—by  forces  unleashed  within  the
humanities  and other  fields  of  academic  inquiry  itself.1 The  causes  that  drove  this
development are manifold, and it is not clear yet to what degree the humanities have
actually been implicated in their own downfall.  That right-wing political  strategists
such  as  Steve  Bannon  have  used  critical  jargon  to  “deconstruct”  the  notion  of
government as we knew it, is indeed puzzling. Yet there is little evidence that humanist
critical thinking is at the core of the current post-truth crisis, and that postmodernist
efforts  to  rethink  and  question  modernist  forms  of  critique  should  be  undone
altogether.
5 And, finally, politics: In conclusion to my admittedly haphazard remarks on truth and
post-truth, I ask, how could we possibly remedy the widespread disregard for public
institutions, the demise of common sense, and the shattering of political dialogue, all
three  salient  markers  of  our  own,  so-called  post-truth  era?  Far  from  being  an
epistemological  crisis,  the  current  cultural  transformation,  I  want  to  suggest,  has
already  called  forth  far-reaching  social  and  political  consequences  that  need  to  be
addressed. To hold the negative repercussions of cultural and technological change in
check,  salvage  meaningful  political  dialogue  in  a  largely  digital,  privatized  media
environment, in short, to make a strong case for truth-speaking as a form of critique
and meaningful participation in politics, scholars in the humanities—their dwindling
cultural authority notwithstanding—must weigh in on the issue at hand. If we agree
that truth, as William James put it, “is made, just as health, wealth and strength are
made, in the course of experience” (104), then not only is it imperative that as many as
possible participate in the process of truth-making, but that they do so responsibly.
 
1. Telling the Truth
6 As Italian media theorist Chiara Cappelletto recently noted, there is a long prehistory
to the current debate about truth and post-truth. In a paper delivered at a 2017 LMU
graduate  conference  on  “Alternative  Facts:  Between  Fact,  Fiction,  and  Politics,”
Cappelletto emphasized that “the idea of an impersonal truth based on factual data is
relatively recent in Western culture” (2). In classical oratory and rhetoric, for example,
the factitiousness of an experience largely depended on the persuasive power of the
orator who strives to present an argument in such a way that it appeared both rational
and factual. Moreover, issues of truth cut across a wide variety of disciplines, such as
epistemology,  language  philosophy,  rhetoric,  poetics,  ethics,  etc.  Scholars  in  these
fields are by and large disinclined to connect truth to some form of objective reality
outside  and  beyond  human  intervention.  Just  consider  Ferdinand  de  Saussure’s
structuralist  theory  of  language.  Rather  than carrying  innate,  unchanging meaning
(signified), words (signifier), depending on how they are used and in which context, can
mean different things to different speakers/listeners. To disentangle the ‘true’ meaning
of  words  can  thus  be  treacherous.  Far  from  representing  reality  “as  is,”  the  way
humans  use  language,  linguists  tell  us,  has  been  crucial  in  shaping  our  respective
notions of the real, including what we usually consider true or false. 
7 From  Plato  to  Poststructuralism,  truth  has  been  a  conflicted  issue.  To  distinguish
between  its  various  meanings  as  an,  at  once,  epistemological,  moral,  and  social
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construct has proven to be nearly impossible. Heidegger’s discussion of truth and Being
in Being and Time, titled “Dasein, disclosedness, and truth” (ch. 44), is a case in point.
For here, Heidegger connects truth to our being-in-the-world, thereby grounding it in
the human condition rather than in a preexisting, self-evident material world. Truth,
according  to  Heidegger,  is  inextricably  linked  to  Dasein and  language.  From  an
ontological perspective, there is no truth that predates Dasein, our being-in-the-world,
and of someone who says “I” and who exists in time and place. For Heidegger, truth
cannot  be  explained by  way  of  a  theory  of  correspondences  alone  (as  in  Aristotle,
Parmenides,  and others).  Any speech act,  even if  merely reflective of an irrefutable
aspect of human existence, such as, say, mortality or gravity, engages the interlocutor
in  myriad different  ways,  not  all  of  them factual  or  verifiable.  By  the  same token,
Heidegger foregrounds the intuitive and performative level of language; and since our
being-in-the-world is predicated on the vagaries of language, that is, “disguised and
closed off by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity” (BT 264), it is largely tied up with un-
truth rather than with truth: “Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of being is such
that it is in ‘un-truth’” (BT 264). 
8 Heidegger’s remarks on truth are complex, as they involve a number of linguistic and
logical  issues,  such as  negative  assertive  statements  and  the  general  problem  of
denotation.2 Prior to Heidegger’s engagement, the latter has been famously discussed
in Bertrand Russell’s 1905 essay “On Denoting.” Though primarily concerned with the
mathematical  and  logical  ramifications  of  denotation,  Russell’s  essay  is  important
because it argues that we often have access to what we consider as being true solely by
way of denotation and not through direct knowledge.  “There seems no reason,” he
writes, “to believe that we are ever acquainted with other people’s minds, seeing that
these are not directly perceived; hence what we know about them is obtained through
denoting” (480). While all thinking has to start with direct experience, “it succeeds in
thinking about many things with which we have no acquaintance” (480). Therefore, as
Russell  concludes,  “such  things  as  matter  (in  the  sense  in  which  matter  occurs  in
physics) and the minds of other people are known to us only by denoting phrases, i.e.,
we  are  not  acquainted with  them,  but  we  know  them  as  what  has  such  and  such
properties” (492). If Russell’s remarks on denotation go against any theory of truth that
posits  a  correspondence  between  an  utterance  and  the  object  it  is  referring  to,
Heidegger’s ontological approach is even more radical. In the aforementioned chapter
of Being and Time, “Dasein, disclosedness and truth,” he argues that to speak the truth
can  manifest  itself  in  two,  fundamentally  opposite  ways:  for  one,  it  can  be  an  un-
covering or dis-covering (ent-decken) and, for another, a covering-up, a “zu-decken” and “
ver-decken” of Being.
9 Significantly if also somewhat paradoxically, both are crucial for an understanding of
the relation of truth and Dasein,  and both are inextricably intertwined. Even though
there is a right way to speak the truth about an object or a thing, namely, the un-
covering or dis-covering of its Being, quite frequently the coeval potential for covering-
up, which for Heidegger is closely associated with the human condition itself, takes the
upper hand. An unavoidable consequence of language, the covering-up has to be fought
continuously and relentlessly. To reign in the human propensity for ambiguity and un-
truth,  however,  has  nothing to do with coherence or  correspondence,  that  is,  with
being  right  or  wrong.  As  Heidegger  repeatedly  stresses,  any  statement  about  an
abstract idea or an object is by necessity always true, either in relation to the person
speaking or as the bringing forth, the foregrounding, of the mode of Being of the object
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spoken about. If a sign points towards something that is then designated, the relation
between the sign and what is signified, as Heidegger insists, does in no way presuppose
correspondence or verisimilitude.
10 What then distinguishes someone who speaks the truth from someone who utters a lie
is the effort made by the former to curb the innate tendency of human speech to cover-
up, camouflage and to dissimulate. The truth or, as Heidegger calls it, demonstration
(“Bewährung”) of any speech activity correlates with its power to un-cover: “What is to
be confirmed is that it discovers the being toward which it is. What is demonstrated is
the discovering being of  the assertion” (BT 201).  [“Zur Bewährung kommt,  daß das
aussagende Sein zum Ausgesagten ein Aufzeigen des Seienden ist, daß es das Seiende,
zu dem es ist, entdeckt” (SZ 218)]. Obviously, Heidegger’s critique of defining truth as
merely a function of the correspondence between verbal statements and non-verbal
facts  resonates  with  postmodern,  poststructuralist  theories  of  language.  Yet  it  also
differs  significantly  from,  say,  the  deconstructionist  approach  to  language  which
presupposes an ongoing playing of  signifiers  and,  therefore,  an ongoing deferral  of
meaning.  For,  if  from  an  ontological  perspective,  Being  and  truth  are  mutually
dependable, so are Being and non-truth: if “Dasein is in the truth,” as Heidegger writes,
then it is also true that “Dasein is in untruth” (BT 204).
11 Moreover,  since  Dasein  is  rooted  “equiprimordially  in  truth  and untruth”  (BT 205)
[“Das Dasein ist gleichursprünglich in der Wahrheit und Unwahrheit” (SZ 223)],  the
truth of Being always has to be wrested from Being itself (“abgerungen”), it is almost a
kind of theft (“Raub”). This latter idea of “wresting” truth from Being, which evokes a
strenuous, painful struggle for truth, is of utmost significance in light of the current
post-truth  debate.  Because  it  suggests  a  willful  attempt  at  un-covering  layers  of
ambiguity and un-truth, to “speak the truth,” for Heidegger, is to engage in a special
kind of speech activity, driven by an intention to forcefully dis-cover the truth of Being.
It should not go unnoticed, however, that Heidegger flat-out dismisses the idea of a
subjective truth or any kind of solipsism regarding the truth of Being. Though closely
bound-up with language and Being, truth as either un-covering (“entdeckend”) or as a
covering-up (“Verdeckung”) exists independently of individual reasoning. If  both of
these modes of speaking represent different aspects of Being, the former, as Heidegger
repeatedly emphasizes, should always be preferable to the latter. What is more, if a
speech act that un-covers is in every respect more desirable than one that covers up,
the former always necessitates an effort on the part of the speaker because she has to
overcome the ambiguity arising from language itself. Speaking the truth, after all, is
not about correspondences between words and objects or ideas; rather it turns on the
ability of the speaker—and of what is spoken—to lay bare the truth of Being itself.
12 Insofar  as  Heidegger’s  ontological  notion  of  truth  as  the  “disclosedness”  of  Being
stresses the performative aspects of a speech act that dis- or un-covers, it situates truth
within  the  field  of  discourse.  Important  differences  notwithstanding,  Heidegger’s
analysis here dovetails with Foucault’s interest in parrhesia (speaking the truth) which
has been the focus of a series of six lectures delivered at the University of California,
Berkeley, titled “Discourse and Truth.”3 As Foucault points out at the outset of these
lectures, his objective is not to define truth as such, that is, how someone knows that a
given statement is either true or false. What he looks at instead is speaking-the-truth as
discourse, an auto-referential speech act the Greeks called parrhesia. Foucault actually
uses the broader, less technical term “speech activity,” for parrhesia, as he takes pains
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to explain, does not simply mean “speaking the truth.” If translated literally, parrhesia
means “to say everything,” not to withhold anything you have to say and to say it in
the most direct and straightforward fashion. Parrhesia thus refers to a speaker and the
way he speaks; and since he is not holding back anything he has in his mind, he opens
himself  up  to  an  interlocutor  by  way  of  discourse  (to  retool  Heidegger’s  notion  of
disclosedness, you could say he dis-closes himself to the interlocutor). Yet in order to
use  parrhesia and  become  a  parrhesiastes,  a  specific  discursive  context  is  required.
Foucault lists three characteristics that are needed so that the idea of parrhesia applies.
First, danger: “The parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk”4; if a politician speaks
the truth in spite of the risk of losing his or her popularity because what he or she has
to say is against the public opinion then he or she uses parrhesia; second, criticism: “The
function of parrrhesia is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, but has the
function of criticism: criticism of the interlocutor or of the speaker himself”; and third,
duty: consider a speaker who has the option to either speak freely or not to speak at all
(i.e. who does not speak under pressure or torture); if he or she then says something
that is critical of someone else who is more powerful than the speaker him- or herself
merely because he or she feels it to be his or her duty, then and only then, Foucault
argues, the speaker can be called a parrhesisastes.
13 Both Heidegger’s definition of truth as a violent, strenuous un-covering of the hidden
layers  of  Dasein and  Foucault’s  interest  in  parrhesia as  a  dangerous  yet  dutiful
intervention of an individual into public discourse resonate in important ways with the
current post-truth crisis.  Both refrain from exploring the possibility of knowing the
truth  as  such;  rather,  they  ask  about  the  conditions  of  speaking  the  truth,  of  its
potential,  in Heidegger’s case, to bring to light important yet hidden aspects of our
being-in-the world and, in Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia, of why it matters that we
speak truly even if against our own best interest. Speaking the truth thus appears to be
much more—or, if you want, less—than merely an epistemological issue, it becomes a
social  imperative.  Heidegger’s  more  opaque  ontological  approach,  one  could  argue,
may have served well to camouflage his own fatal implication in totalitarian politics
during his term as Rektor of the University of Freiburg. Because it stresses un-truth as
an  indelible  ingredient  of  truth  itself,  it  could  be  easily  misread  as  an  all-out
opportunistic,  overly  malleable  concept.  Like  Foucault,  however,  he  stresses  the
discursive aspects of speaking truthfully and, what is more, the fact that truth is not
some  kind  of  “ready-made”  entity  to  be  either  chosen  or  overlooked.  For  both,
Heidegger and Foucault, truth is part and parcel of the act of speaking out against all
odds, and it is only then, under the arduous conditions of criticism, danger, and duty,
that truth as discourse is forged from a world of un-truth and covering-up.
 
2. Know It Yourself
14 As many have noted, anti-professional attitudes, coupled with a profound suspicion of
institutions of  higher  learning,  are  on the rise.5 According to  a  2017 Pew Research
Center poll, a majority of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents in the US
now believes that “colleges and universities… have a negative effect on the country”
(quoted  in  Green,  NYT).  In  a  recent  article  in  The  Federalist,  political  scientist  Tom
Nichols even depicts a large-scale sell-out of knowledge amounting to what he calls the
“death  of  expertise.”  The  ramifications  of  this  latest  distrust  in  expertise  are
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considerable, as it extends far beyond academic institutions to affect almost any form
of professional training. The reasons for this development are manifold. If  the easy
availability of rudimentary professional knowhow via online sources has fueled a new
“do-it-yourself”/“know-it-yourself” amateur culture, cultural and institutional factors
also conjoined to spawn the dismantling of professional knowledge.6 In the US, anti-
elitism  and  anti-intellectualism  have,  for  a  long  time,  shaped  a  cultural-industrial
complex  determined  to  undermine  professional  expertise  and  the  authority  of
institutionalized knowledge.7
15 Yet, anti-professionalism has also grown from within the academy itself. Long before
Trump lionized  the  widespread  populist  attacks  on  science  and the  university,  the
French historian of  science,  Bruno Latour,  argued that the erosion of  expertise has
been fostered, at least in part,  from within the humanities and the critical sciences
themselves.  Remarkably  prescient  of  recent  developments,  Latour’s  aforementioned
2004 essay “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam” takes issue with an already widening
gap between the world of science and the world of Joe-the-plumber, that is, blue-collar
America. “What has become of critique,” Latour asks, “when there is a whole industry
denying  that  the  Apollo  program  landed  on  the  moon?”  (228).  And  what  “if
explanations resorting automatically to power,  society,  discourse had outlived their
usefulness  and  deteriorated  to  the  point  of  now  feeding  the  most  gullible  sort  of
critique?” (229–30).  If  the former already speaks to an increasing onslaught of  fake
news and conspiracy theories, the latter raises considerable doubt regarding critical
practices  within  the  humanities  that  have  actually  ceased  to  be  critical  at  all,  and
instead have championed knee-jerk responses (“power, society, discourse”) for almost
every social and cultural issue there is. 
16 Obviously, Latour could not have known that Stephen Bannon and other right-wing
strategists  would use poststructuralist  jargon to powerfully “deconstruct” American
government. As he noticed early on, however, for conservatives to raise doubt about
the scientific evidence of global warming, a critique Latour’s own writing had been
complicit in administering, offered an inroad to eventually dismiss scientific expertise
altogether. Though for science studies, a field he had helped establish, “the question
was never to get away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on
the contrary, renewing empiricism” (231). Yet it’s largely rationalist approach to the
contrary, the critical study of science has paved the way for the most egregious and
dangerous anti-enlightenment thinking.  “The mistake we made,”  Latour grudgingly
admits, “the mistake I made, was to believe that there was no efficient way to criticize
matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing one’s attention toward
the conditions that made them possible” (231).
17 To remedy the loss of a shared experience of reality triggered by identity politics and
accompanying  relativist  concepts  such  as  “situated”  knowledge  (Haraway),8 Latour
calls for a return to a new “realist” attitude: if critical thinking, and, by implication, the
humanities at large, should be able to renew itself and thus have a future, “it is to be
found in the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude…, but a realism dealing with
what I call matters of concern, not matters of fact” (231). Though reality is by no means
defined entirely  by matters  of  fact,  facts  do matter  in  that  they are often political
renderings of matters of concern or, to a lesser extent, “states of affairs” (232). Latour
clearly describes his own effort at debunking certain myths surrounding the history of
science as closely wedded to Enlightenment thought. Yet while enlightenment thinkers
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originally used scientific facts to criticize older, premodern beliefs and illusions, over
time  these  facts  have  been  used  to  also  cover  up  some  of  science’s  own  innate
prejudices and vested interests. As of yet, it is by no means clear whether we can devise
“another powerful descriptive tool that deals this time with matters of concern and
whose import then will no longer be to debunk but to protect and to care?” (232). In
other words, can matters of concern be reframed so that they include more than just
one  fractured  version  of  reality,  and  become  a  powerful  driving  force  in  today’s
globalized yet hopelessly divided world?
18 Whatever this new kind of realism might entail, it should not be of the same ilk as the
so-called  “new  humanities,”  proffered  by  Harvard  psychologist  Steven  Pinker in  a
controversial  2013  piece  for  the  New  Republic,  titled  “Science  is  Not  Your  Enemy.”
Pinker  and  his  conservative  fellow  critics  envision  a  field  stripped  of  its  idealist
trappings  and  so  redefined  that  it  is  decidedly  more  receptive  to  scientific
methodology. To thus “scientize” the humanities, however, is not a solution but yet
another attempt at cementing the waning influence and public reputation not merely
of the soft sciences but of the university at large. “Being is in no way identical with
reality or with a precisely determined actuality,” Heidegger writes in an epilogue to his
essay “The Thing.” “In thinking of Being, it is never the case that only something actual
is represented in our minds and then given out as that which alone is true” (181). It is
this latter kind of self-critical inquiry into the conditions of Being that the humanities
of old—and, frankly, all of enlightenment thinking—have been good at. Latour is right
in arguing that the task of the humanities is to return to a new sense of realism, a
realism of concern, or as Heidegger would put it, a realism that “examines as it listens”
(184).  To  follow such a  path,  Heidegger  knew all  too  well,  takes  both courage  and
practice in going. Yet practice also needs craft, and so to stay on the path, as Heidegger
writes  in  a  letter  to  a  young student,  we need to  learn unswervingly  “the craft  of
thinking, yet erring.”9 
 
3. Common Sense
19 It should have become sufficiently clear by now that the idea of a post-truth cultural
environment makes little sense. What has changed significantly with the onslaught of
“digimodernism,” Alan Kirby’s term for the now dominant form of neoliberal, digitized
global capitalism, is by no means the disappearance of truth as we know it.10 Rather,
what has been “covered up,” to retool Heidegger’s wording in Being and Time,  is our
appreciation and understanding of the pivotal role of parrhesia, of speaking the truth
even in the face of danger and of negative consequences for the speaking self. This,
then, brings me to the issue of politics and of what could be possibly done about the
alarming  demise  of  common  sense,  a  term  I  use  here  in  its  broadest  and  most
democratic meaning, that is, as the shared experience of reality and of the values that
we attach to this reality. 
20 If  anti-professionalism  and  the  death  of  expertise  have  been  conducive  to  further
diminish the reputation of the humanities and, to a great extent, of the sciences in
general, the conspicuous absence of any meaningful political alternative to late (digital)
capitalism has further eroded our willingness to speak out in public, to become (again)
—as Foucault has it—parrhesiastes. However urgent we now think this issue is, the crisis
of public intervention in politics, as Richard Sennett has shown, has been coeval with
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the  birth  of  modern  society  itself.11 In  fact,  the  erosion  of  the  public  arena  as  a
performative space where political decision-making is both enacted and acted out dates
back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when the public domain has
been increasingly emptied out of its earlier, social meaning. Sennett describes these
transformative changes in the public  domain as the substitution of  the public  by a
private self. In other words, even though the enlightenment has incubated, by way of
the printing press and the burgeoning new metropolitan spaces, a powerful culture of
public discourse and public performance, by the end of the nineteenth century it had
been almost completely layered over by an inward-looking culture of intimacy.
21 In  1977,  the  year  his  landmark study  was  originally  published,  Sennett  could  have
hardly envisioned the new public spaces opened up by social media and the internet.
Yet his principle argument, it seems to me, still rings true. The lenses through which
most  of  us  view  the  world  are  now  almost  entirely  filtered  by  private,  intimate
concerns.  By  the  same  token,  we  consider  the  taking  on  of  a  public  office,  our
membership in a church, a trade union, or a political party, and even voting itself, as—
at best—a formal obligation and—at worst—a dispensable nuisance. “In a society where
intimate feeling is an all-purpose standard of society,” Sennett explains, “experience is
organized in two forms which lead to… unintended destructiveness. In such a society
the basic human energies of narcissism are so mobilized that they enter systematically
and perversely into human relationships. In such a society, the test of whether people
are being authentic and ‘straight’  with each other is  a  peculiar standard of  market
exchange in intimate relations” (8).
22 Sennett  wrote  The  Fall  of  Public  Man  against  the  backdrop  of  the  countercultural
revolution of the 1970s, which heavily emphasized individual authenticity and personal
expression. And yet, it would be difficult to think of a more appropriate description of
the social-cultural environment that enabled the Trump presidency and that many now
call the post-truth era. If politics today ostensibly encroach every nook and cranny of
individual self-expression (just think of academic ‘safe’ spaces and the ongoing policing
of the self by way of social and commercial pressure), both political reasoning and the
willingness to speak out and criticize the powers that be, have become conspicuously
dysfunctional. Multiple forces have driven this development, yet it is equally obvious
that  for  too  long  societies  in  the  West  have  stressed  individual  experience  at  the
expense of public responsibility. When Thomas Paine, at the beginning of Common Sense
(1776), calls government the “badge of lost innocence” because it is an intrinsically evil
force yet necessary to “restrain our vices” (69), he not only recognizes the volatility of
the human psyche. What he also acknowledges is the need for a social contract and the
division of  power as  cornerstones  of  any modern society.  All  modern nations have
delegated,  though to varying degrees,  executive power to the government,  juridical
power to the courts, and the power to inform and enlighten about the state of affairs to
the press. Simultaneously, they have either actively created or at least tolerated public
spaces  that  provide  room  for  individual  expression  and  participation  in  decision-
making processes.
23 That in a democracy a small number of politicians yield executive power over their
fellow citizens is  a  calamity;  yet  one,  as  Paine argues,  that  is  acceptable because it
ultimately guarantees freedom and security. The consenting of the majority of citizens
to “leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole
body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who
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appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act
were  they  present”  (CS 7–8)  is  based,  for  one,  on  the  condition  that  this  body  of
representatives is being elected into office; and for another, it rests on the assumption
that there will be a common interest among every part of the community. To ensure
that  the  elected  “might  never  form  to  themselves  an  interest  separate  from  the
electors, prudence will point out the propriety of having elections often” (CS 8). The
rationale here is to avoid division by interest and status, and instead to strengthen the
interconnectedness—what  Paine  calls  “mingling”—of  both  parties,  so  that  they
mutually support each other.
24 At the outset of modern society there has thus been a shared understanding of the
wisdom of certain rules and norms that were in place for the common good. There has
also  been  widespread  agreement  that  the  “truth”  of  democracy  and  of  modern
government  can  never  be  stated  in  abstract,  objectified  terms.  If  absolute  truth
obtained as an important social goal, it was unavoidably inflected “by the inability of
moral virtue to govern the world” (CS 8). Yet like many enlightenment thinkers, Paine
was convinced that “however our eyes may be dazzled with show, or our ears deceived
by sound; however prejudice may warp our wills, or interest darken our understanding,
the simple voice of nature and of reason will say, it [i.e. to be governed in that way] is
right” (CS 8). It is by virtue of reason or common sense alone that we subscribe to the
social contract that undergirds all modern political institutions. What this also means,
however, is that one should avoid any form of dishonesty while holding public office,
regardless of whether it is directed towards oneself or towards the electors. Once a man
has  so  far  “corrupted and prostituted the  chastity  of  his  mind,  as  to  subscribe  his
professional belief to things he does not believe,” Paine later wrote in The Age of Reason,
“he has prepared himself for the commission of every other crime” (AR 8).  What is
more, it would be impossible to calculate “the moral mischief… that mental lying has
produced in society” (AR 8). This notion of an almost moral obligation to be true to
oneself also informs Foucault’s parrhesiastes. Far from ushering in a world of multiple
and therefore of no truth at all, to avoid “mental lying,” in both Paine and Foucault,
enables political praxis because it allows the speaker to act responsibly in the public
arena.
25 There is plenty of room to speculate why the ideals of mental honesty and of parrhesia
have become totally corrupted. Or, why many have lost confidence in the institutions
initially set up to support and guarantee individual freedom. “I do not believe,” Paine
states in The Age of Reason (1794), “in the creed professed by the Jewish church, by the
Roman church, by the Greek church, by the Turkish church, by the Protestant church,
nor by any church that I know of. My own mind is my own church” (AR 8, my emphasis).
The  ambivalence  of  this  kind  of  idealization  of  personal  authenticity  is  obvious.
Moreover, it reflects much larger contradictions well embedded within Enlightenment
thinking itself. As Peter Gay points out, “the state within, and the state system as a
whole  appeared  to  have  aims  incompatible  with  enlightened  ideals”  (450).  If
Enlightenment ideas appealed to a large extent to individual reasoning independent
from  and  often  at  odds  with  institutionalized  knowledge  and  tradition,  political
formations,  on  the  other  hand,  demand  the  persistence  of  habit,  the  burden  of
deference, and the accountability of rules. Put differently, intellectual self-reliance and
the exigencies of  the state are often—if  not mutually exclusive—at least  difficult  to
integrate.
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26 This  also means that  the tendency towards ever  greater  civil  division,  as  well  as  a
growing tension between the state and its  constituents,  is  firmly nested within the
intellectual foundations of modern democratic society itself. “As for morality,” Paine
proudly  stated  in  The  Age  of  Reason, “the  knowledge  of  it  exists  in  every  man’s
conscience” (AR 183). The enlightenment’s dependence on science and factual evidence
to the contrary, the same could be said of the notion of truth. It is in this context that
the  companion idea  of  “common sense”  truly  matters.  As  guarantor  of  collectively
shared values, duties, and morals, common sense—in its broadest and most inclusive
understanding—could guide us  through the maze of  subjective experiences and the
political fallout of the modern culture of intimacy (including its latest version as post-
truth). That we collectively agree on the kind of reality we privilege and cherish, it
seems to me, is now more imperative than ever. For the demise of common sense does
not bode well—for the university, for society, and for the future of mankind as we know
it.
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ABSTRACTS
This essay argues that there is no such thing as post-truth. We are by no means in the middle of
an unprecedented epistemological crisis that keeps us from telling right from wrong. Rather,
what we currently witness is a major breakdown of the institutions and mechanics of democratic
society, triggered by an encompassing technological transformation that affects both our public
and private lives. Even if the challenges for rational public discourse are real, they should not be
countered  by  philosophy  but  by  concerted,  serious  interventions  in the political arena.  This
essay’s approach to the issue of post-truth, therefore, is threefold: First, it looks at how most of
us in the West have come to agree on certain truths about truth. Second, since the notion of post-
truth is often invoked to expose someone who fails to speak the truth (rather than to demote the
concept of truth altogether), it refers to the Greek tradition of parrhesia as discussed by the late
Michel Foucault. And thirdly, this essay comments on the alarming rise of anti-professionalism.
Long before neoconservatives waged war on the university, the erosion of expertise has been
fostered, according to Bruno Latour, by forces unleashed within the humanities itself. Yet there
is little evidence, this essays concludes, that humanist critical thinking is driving the current
post-truth crisis  and that  postmodernist  efforts  to  rethink and question modernist  forms of
critique should be undone altogether.
INDEX
Keywords: concept of post-truth; modernist vs. postmodernist critique; crisis of the humanities;
anti-professionalism; Michel Foucault and the politics of parrhesia
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